COIN Advisory and Assistance Team
&
COIN in Afghanistan

COL Joe Felter

"We need to think and act very differently to be successful."

GEN Stanley A. McChrystal
Commander, ISAF

CAAT Mission Statement & Purpose

Mission

CAAT observes, assesses, and reports on COIN activities; identifies best practices; and advises and assists commanders at all levels to enable effective, integrated COIN operations in Afghanistan

Purpose

To assist Commanders at all levels, identify trends, and disseminate best practices, in order to facilitate ISAF organizational and cultural change

CAAT Key Tasks

- Facilitate changing the culture of the force
- Provide COMISAF with unbiased, critical analysis and recommend solutions
- Identify and disseminate best COIN practices throughout the theater
- Support pre-deployment training for forces
- Facilitate continuity during RIP / TOA
- Teach, coach, and mentor leaders at all levels on COIN
- Review staff processes that advance or impede COIN efforts
- Facilitate unity of effort by, with, and through all actors

CAAT Personnel By RC Teams



HQ CAAT Subject Matter Experts

- Lessons Learned
- Information Operations
- Media Advisor
- Rule of Law
- Cultural Advisor
- Police Advisor
- HUMINT Advisor
- SIGINT Advisor
- COIN Academic Research Team (CART)

CAAT Initiatives





Eight COIN Imperatives

1. ***Protect and Partner with the People***

2. ***Conduct a Comprehensive Counterinsurgency Campaign***

3. ***Understand the Environment***

4. ***Ensure Values Underpin our Effort***

5. ***Listen Closely—Speak Clearly.***

6. ***Act as One Team***

7. ***Constantly Adapt***

8. ***Act with Courage and Resolve.***

Cornerstones of the ISAF COIN Campaign

-Focus on the Population

-Support Local Governance

-Partner at Every Level

"Undermine the insurgent argument while providing a more compelling alternative"

CIVCAS CONTEXT – STRATEGIC ISSUE

"Because of CIVCAS I think that we have just about eroded out credibility here in Afghanistan. The constant repeat of CIVCAS is now so dangerous that it threatens the mission…I want confirmation that every soldier in the command from every country understands the Tactical Directive"

COMISAF (13 Apr 10)

COMISAF's Directives

Tactical Directive

- **Protect the Population--win support**
- **Accept tactical risk**

Avoid *Strategic Failure*

- **Tactical Patience**
- **Couragous restraint**
- **Battle damage assessment**
- **Cultural Considerations**
- **Incidents: Stay, assess, report, explain**

Escalation of Force *and* ROE

Revised SOP 373 EOF (APR 10)


ESCALATION OF FORCE POCKET GUIDE
Protecting Ourselves and the Population
March 2010
Command Guidance:
"Protecting the people is the mission. The conflict will be won by persuading the population, not by destroying the enemy. ISAF will succeed when the GIRoA earns the support of the people."
-GEN McChrystal & CSM Hall, August 2009
UNCLASSIFIED
Disclaimer: Always rely on existing doctrine. Examine and use the information herein in light of your mission, operational environment, the Law of War, and other situational factors
Are you Falling into a Trap?
Your tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) for responding to threats during operations are known by the enemy. Moreover, insurgents purposely disguise hostile actors as, or amongst the civilian population, and deliberately manipulate the circumstances to draw us into a trap of causing CIVCAS. Insurgents have used this knowledge to create a highly successful propaganda campaign using local "word of mouth" to spread misinformation throughout the Afghan populace. Insurgents will seek to attribute all CIVCAS incidents to us or ANSF. Where CIVCAS occurs, whoever causes it, we will be accused of having failed to protect the population.
CIVCAS "TRAP" Indicators
• Location (Politically Sensitive Areas)
- Are you being attacked from a location that can increase the chances for CIVCAS?
- School during class periods
- Mosque during prayer
- Heavily populated areas
• Proximity & Accessibility
- Are you being drawn into attacking a location where you can not observe your effects?
- Are you being baited into reacting with Mortars or Air Support on a location that is in close proximity to gatherings and structures where non-combatants are located?
Alternative Actions
- Can you conduct Tactical Callout?
- Can you disengage?
- If so, what are the 2nd and 3rd order effects of disengaging?
1 Planning
• Develop EOF TTP's
- Entry Control Point
- Vehicle Checkpoints
- Foot Patrols
- Vehicle Patrols
- Convoys
• Use Local and ANSF knowledge
• Consider:
- Population
- Local Behaviour
- Troop Capabilities
- Physical Conditions
2 Preparation
• Understand the EOF process
• Understand your Environment
• Prepare the Population (Explain TTPs)
• Conduct Combined training with partnered ANSF unit
- Escalation of Force
- Escalation of Lethal Force
- Call for Fire (CAS, CCA, etc)
- Weapons Capabilities and Effects
• Rehearse Follow Up measures
3 Execution
• Follow the EOF process
- Assess
- Match
- Act
- Reassess
• Involve ANSF where available
• Protect yourself AND the people
• Maintain constant awareness of possible 2nd and 3rd order effects of your actions
Escalation of Force Incident
4 Follow- Up
• Maintain a Presence
• Gather the Evidence
- Video
- Digital Photography
- Statement of Witnesses
• Engage with the Locals
• Review and Report
• Identify Lessons
• Provide Feedback- Good and Bad

Driving Directive

- **We're highly visible; dismount, talk, & shop**
- **Slow down, don't interrupt traffic, let civilians pass**
- **Every incident on the roads becomes an ISAF incident**
- **Reckless & aggressive driving**
- **Alienates Afghan people**

Civilian Casualties

- **Can win tactically but lose strategically**
  - **"*CIVCAS is how we LOSE*"**
  - **Insurgent math: -1 Civ + 20 INS**
- **CIVCAS spike despite COM emphasis**
- **Appropriate escalation & Positive ID?**
- **Understanding/behaviour ingrained during training & ops?**



ISAF + Insurgent Generated Civilian Casualties (Jan 2009 – Mar 2010)


Legend
Total Civilian Casualties
0
0 to 4 per 100,000 Population
4 to 15 per 100,000 Population
15 to 50 per 100,000 Population
50 to 150 per 100,000 Population
More than 150 per 100,000 Population

Effects of Civilian Casualties on Subsequent Violence

ISAF-Generated CIVCAS



Insurgent-Generated CIVCAS



SIGACTs: Direct Fire, Indirect Fire, IED Explosions, IED Found and Cleared, IED Found and Cleared, Mine Strike, Mine Cleared, Own Goal, SAFIRE, Premature Detonation
CIVCAS: Number of women and children killed or injured

Propaganda and Civilian Cas...

- INS attack in Nangahar killed Afghan soldiers, wounded ISAF troops, and killed two Afghan children.
- INS begin whisper campaign as violence separates ISAF troops from population
- People were motivated to take to the streets indicates active efforts by anti-government/ anti-ISAF factions

Protestors in Jalalabad, Jan. 7

Source: Addendum to Initial Trip Report for Nangarhar visit submitted on January 11, 2010 (CAAT Cultural Awareness LnOs)

The Benefits of Courageous Restraint

“We won’t win if we do not partner. We have to work around the challenges and we have to get on with it- all of us.”

General Stanley McChrystal

April 2010

June 25, 1876 *Little Bighorn, Montana, USA* Tir 5, 1255



"The Sioux did not take a single soldier prisoner…none were left alive for even a few minutes." – Lakota Chief Red Horse

1914-1918 *German East Africa* 1292-1297

Lettow-Vorbeck's fluency in the Swahil language earned the instant respect and admiration of his African soldiers

June, 1755 *Fort Duquesne, Pennsylvania, USA* Khordad, 1134

"[Braddock] made it clear that he had neither respect for Indians as adversaries nor any interest in their military

1965-1971 *Vietnam* 1343-1349

"The struggle was in the rice paddies....in and among the people, not passing through but living among them, night and day .... joining with them in steps toward a better

Voices from the Field
ISAF Partnering Survey

- Pulse of the force on their attitudes towards partnering
  - Approximately 2000 responses mostly US in RC East and RC South
  - Completed in Feb 2010
  - Definitions, pro's and con's, where and at what level units partner
- Open Ended Questions include: "What is partnering? Describe good and bad partnering? What are the advantages and disadvantages of partnering?
- Closed end questions include: "How often does your unit partner?"; "At what level does your unit partner?"; "What activities does your unit partner?"; "During what phase of the operation do you partner?"

What are the biggest advantages of partnering?

"It is the only way to hand over responsibility to [the Afghans]."

- NCO, 4TH BCT, 4TH ID

Subjective Questions	Most Common Response Categories	Percentage
1. “In your opinion, what is partnering?”	**Team Effort** : Includes relationship building, work-eat-live together	84%
2. “In your opinion, what are the best indicators of good partnering?”	**Social interaction, Rapport; Trust, Communication:** Includes: socializing, sustained relationship, treat as equals, barriers come down, mutual respect, open communication	54%
3. “What does bad partnering look like?”	**Limited Involvement**: Lack of HN involvement or CF not involving partnered force	51%
4. “What are the biggest risks or disadvantages of partnering?”	**ANSF Performance and Reliability Issues**	53%
5. “What are the biggest advantages of partnering?”	**Capabilities; Cultural Awareness; Force Multiplier**	61%


How often does your unit partner?
1000
800
600
400
200
0
193 (10%)
223 (12%)
536 (29%)
926 (49%)
Never
Rarely
Sometimes
Almost always

At what level do you see partnering in your unit?



During what phase of the operation does your unit partner?



- Half of respondents say partnering happens “Most of the Time” during Mission Execution. A quarter respond that partnering occurs in other phases

“We should increase or decrease Partnering”

14. Which statement do you agree with most?



Enlisted	810	43%
NCO	741	39%
Company Grade	224	12%
Field Grade	88	5%
We should increase our level of partnering- it will make us more effective	273	34%
	338	46%
	133	59%
	64	73%
We are partnered at about the right level	377	47%
	285	38%
	67	30%
	26	30%
We should partner less as it makes us less effective	179	22%
	136	18%
	29	13%
	2	2%

Partnering Benefits



Modified from figure 8-1, FM 3-24.2 Chapter 8 ("Support to Host Nation Security Forces")


(+) Capabilities
Legitimate, more capable ISAF
ISAF
ISAF
ANSF
Self Sufficient
ANSF
Legitimate, more capable ANSF
Limited influence
Self Sufficient
(+) Legitimacy
ISAF/ANSF efforts, Shana ba Shana
ANSF
Ineffective Reliance
Limited effectiveness

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